josevalim
Static and session security fixes for Plug
Hello everyone,
Two vulnerabilities have been disclosed to Plug. Applications that provide file uploading functionality to a local filesystem are advised to upgrade immediately. Upgrade is also recommended for any other application that uses Plug, to ensure they follow the latest and best security practices.
We have released new Plug versions v1.0.4, v1.1.7, v1.2.3 and v1.3.2. If you can’t upgrade immediately, we also include fixes you can directly add to your applications.
Null Byte Injection in Plug.Static
Plug.Static is used for serving static assets, and is vulnerable to null byte injection. If file upload functionality is provided, this can allow users to bypass filetype restrictions.
We recommend all applications that provide file upload functionality and serve those uploaded files locally with Plug.Static to upgrade immediately or include the fix below. If uploaded files are rather stored and served from S3 or any other cloud storage, you are not affected.
- Versions affected: Plug v1.3.1, v1.3.0, v1.2.2, v1.2.1, v1.2.0, v1.1.6, v1.1.5, v1.1.4, v1.1.3, v1.1.2, v1.1.1, v1.1.0, v1.0.3, v1.0.2, v1.0.1, v1.0.0
- Versions fixed: Plug v1.3.2+, v1.2.3+, v1.1.7+, v1.0.4+
- Author: Griffin Byatt <griffin.byatt[at]nccgroup[dot]trust>
- Thanks to: Chip Durland, Raviv Cohen and Matthew Diaz
Temporary fix
Identify where plug Plug.Static is invoked in your application (in a Phoenix application this means the MyApp.Endpoint) and add the following lines before plug Plug.Static:
plug :safe_plug_static
defp safe_plug_static(conn, _) do
Enum.any?(conn.path_info, &URI.decode(&1) =~ <<0>>) && raise "invalid path"
conn
end
Arbitrary Code Execution in Cookie Serialization
The default serialization used by Plug session may result in code execution in certain situations. Keep in mind, however, the session cookie is signed and this attack can only be exploited if the attacker has access to your secret key as well as your signing/encryption salts. We recommend users to change their secret key base and salts if they suspect they have been leaked, regardless of this vulnerability.
- Versions affected: Plug v1.3.1, v1.3.0, v1.2.2, v1.2.1, v1.2.0, v1.1.6, v1.1.5, v1.1.4, v1.1.3, v1.1.2, v1.1.1, v1.1.0, v1.0.3, v1.0.2, v1.0.1, v1.0.0
- Versions fixed: Plug v1.3.2+, v1.2.3+, v1.1.7+, v1.0.4+
- Author: Griffin Byatt <griffin.byatt[at]nccgroup[dot]trust>
- Thanks to: Matthew Diaz
Temporary fix
If you can’t upgrade immediately, you can temporarily protect yourself by using a custom serializer Plug.Session serializer.
plug Plug.Session, serializer: MyApp.SafeSerializer
Where MyApp.SafeSerializer is defined as:
defmodule SafeSerializer do
def encode(term) do
{:ok, :erlang.term_to_binary(term)}
end
def decode(binary) do
try do
{:ok, safe_terms(:erlang.binary_to_term(binary))}
rescue
_ -> :error
end
end
defp safe_terms(list) when is_list(list) do
for item <- list, do: safe_terms(item)
list
end
defp safe_terms(tuple) when is_tuple(tuple) do
safe_tuple(tuple, tuple_size(tuple))
tuple
end
defp safe_terms(map) when is_map(map) do
for {key, value} <- map do
safe_terms(key)
safe_terms(value)
end
map
end
defp safe_terms(other) when is_atom(other) or is_number(other) or is_binary(other) or
is_pid(other) or is_reference(other) do
other
end
defp safe_terms(other) do
raise ArgumentError, "cannot deserialize #{inspect other}, the term is not safe for deserialization"
end
defp safe_tuple(tuple, 0), do: :ok
defp safe_tuple(tuple, n), do
safe_terms(:erlang.element(n, tuple))
safe_tuple(tuple, n - 1)
end
end
Final remarks
We want to thank the NCC Group for reporting those vulnerabilities.
NCC Group is a global expert in cyber security and risk mitigation, working with businesses to protect their brand, value and reputation against the ever-evolving threat landscape. Our Security Consulting services leverage our extensive knowledge of current security vulnerabilities, penetration testing techniques and software development best practices to enable organizations to secure their applications against ever-present threats. At NCC Group we can boast unrivaled talent and recognized world-class security expertise. Bringing together best in class security consultancies iSEC Partners, Intrepidus Group, Matasano, NCC Group and NGS we have created one of the largest, most respected security consultancies in the world.
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First 10 of 23 Posts
josevalim
dimitarvp
Thanks for staying on top of things, much appreciated! I continue being impressed by you guys.
hubertlepicki
So, as a learning tool, if I get it it means that:
Attacker could alter the cookie to include serialized function, that would get de-serialized and executed during cookie de-serialization? Provided they can keep the cookie cryptographic signature at the same time.
Attacker could fetch a *.db file instead of *.ico file. Provided the secret file is somehow located in priv/static, and programmer specified :only, or :only_matching Plug.Static options. So fetching /assets/secret.db%00%favicon.ico would return secret.db file.
Looking at Plug code I can see the 2) could really happen. Although it would mean the programmer is doing something weird already, like putting the secret.db file where it should not have been.
I can’t see how 1) could be exploited unless the programmer actually executes de-serialized functions. I think :erlang.binary_to_term will not re-define any already existing modules/functions. The only way to exploit it would be that the programmer does execute such de-serialized function, again doing something pretty weird. Is that correct?
josevalim
The function is NOT executed during de-serialization.
You CANNOT bypass the :only and :only_matching checks with the null byte.
I cannot provide detailed information on how to exploit the attacks for now. In a week, once we have given developers enough time to upgrade, I will be glad to answer questions.
hubertlepicki
Okay, even better. I don’t think either of the issues is really severe, both require that programmer does make some bad decisions in addition to patched issues.
yurko
pure speculation below
interesting point, looking forward to hear about what can be done here in a couple weeks. I’m scared of the scalable jwt concept though so I save auth cookies in the database and only process the ones I know I’ve generated
they could maybe upload some bash scripts and the execute them doing something as the app user
@josevalim please do, I’d like to know more
hubertlepicki
I think it is more likely a disallowed MIME type is sent to client. Like, you allow uploading/downloading PNG files but someone uploads a JAR file that gets automatically executed in the client’s browser.
bbense
I would encourage the Phoenix team to create a CVE for this vulnerablity if they have not already.
mariusbutuc
Is there some sort of pipe that we can subscribe to for all sorts of Elixir security releases?
mariusbutuc
Thoughts on something like gemnasium for this?